【系辦轉知】國立清華大學全球化經濟研究中心_2025年秋季大專生研究計畫
國立清華大學全球化經濟研究中心為提升學生對全球化研究的興趣，鼓勵本校學生參與中心成員指導的研究計畫，接受科學研究訓練，將於 114學年上學期舉辦「大專生研究計畫」（辦法如附件），歡迎本校同學申請。
為培育人文社會科學研究之優秀人才，接受本中心優良之師資的指導，至本中心參與研究計畫。
錄取的學生在計畫期間到本中心接受指導，完成執行之研究計畫，並參與中心規劃之活動。
本校大學部在學學生，對於相關研究有興趣者，均可報名甄選
2025 年 9 月 1 日至 11 月 31 日
共同活動的時間規劃為週四週五中午，計畫為期 3 個月。
計畫會進行期中評鑑，未通過者將取消資格需參加成果發表會。
學生完成計畫所需要求後獲發結業證書。
參與人員以學習型兼任研究助理聘任，每月6,000，共計3個月。
2025/06/06 12:10計畫說明會（地點：台積 104 教室），由指導教授們說明甄選計畫之內容
2025/06/07 開始報名（報名網址 https://forms.gle/6yuNghYWv2BXcq9h6）
2025/06/30 報名截止
2025/07/15-2025/07/24 複試（有需要者將進行複試，時間地點另行通知）
2025/08/01 正備取錄取名單公告，於全球化經濟研究中心網站公告，並以 email 通知
2025/08/15 第一次報到截止日，未報到者視為棄權將依序遞補
2025/09/01 錄取學員進入實驗室開始執行計畫
申請人須請於報名網站報名（網址 https://forms.gle/6yuNghYWv2BXcq9h6 ），並繳交資料，可複選申請計畫。申請資料需：(1) 簡歷，(2) 參與動機，(3) 對於申請之計畫的初步構想，(4) 大學成績證明，(5) 其他有利審查文件（活動型社團經驗無需納入）。
請放在同一個 pdf 檔案，最大不得超過 5MB。
未盡事宜另行公布。
Project 1
配對演算法與大學校系招生方式分析（陳語寬教授）
在大學招生的過程中，在個人申請的正、備取或是分科測驗的分數公告後，學生該如何排志願序？雖然坊間流傳許多「策略」，但對學生最為有利的志願排序，就是完全按照自己的喜好填寫。這種誠實回報自己喜好的策略，其實是透過經濟學設計招生配對方式的成果。本計畫基於經濟學理論的預測，改從實證的角度切入，比較台灣大學考試招生情境與配對理論預測的差異。基礎的大學招生配對理論假設有一組固定的大學，以及一組固定的學生。然而在個人申請中，大學校系可以透過調整不同招生管道採計的考試科目、比重、甚至是面試日期等策略，嘗試招收合適的學生。近年更興起單一系所內進一步分組，藉此設定不同的採計科目，或是在大學、學院層級進行不分系招生。配對理論在固定大學校系及學生下已知可以達成穩定的配對結果，但當大學可以策略性的調整招生的校系單位，傳統配對理論的預測會有何變化？在這計畫中我們將蒐集各校系歷年招生方式的變化，並分析這些變化可能的成因與影響。參與計畫的同學可以累積資料處理、分析之經驗，同時視經濟學基礎，也有機會接觸配對的理論及計量經濟學。
Project 2
The geography of British banks in the 18 th and 19 th centuries （李翎帆教授）
England was the first country to undergo industrialisation. The availability of financial resources played a pivotal role in this process. Industrial enterprises, particularly during their early stages, required substantial capital for investment in machinery, infrastructure, raw materials, and labor. Access to credit and investment capital enabled entrepreneurs to expand production, adopt new technologies, and scale operations to meet growing market demands. In this context, banks served not merely as intermediaries but as critical facilitators of industrial transformation, directing savings into productive investments and providing the liquidity essential for day-to-day operations.
Between 1720 and 1825, Parliament prohibited any incorporation without the explicit permission of Parliament or the Crown. The only incorporated bank, the Bank of England, did not open branches outside London until 1826. During this period, England underwent the Industrial Revolution. Without the ability to establish incorporated companies and raise funds through financial markets, entrepreneurs had few alternatives—banks became one of the primary sources of capital. The geography of banking institutions offers valuable insights into the spatial dynamics of industrial development. Banks do not distribute themselves randomly across a landscape; rather, they tend to concentrate in regions with greater commercial potential and industrial activity. Conversely, the presence of a dense banking network can itself stimulate industrial growth by reducing financial frictions and transaction costs. This reciprocal relationship suggests a strong spatial correlation between the development of financial institutions and the emergence of industrial hubs.
Using historical records, this project aims to map British banks in the 18th and 19th centuries. Understanding the spatial distribution of banks will enhance our understanding of how industrial geographies took shape and reveal the intertwined evolution of finance and industry in shaping modern economic landscapes.
Job requirement: the student will be expected to undertake a substantial amount of data collection. In addition to acquiring a foundational understanding of the history of British banking institutions, the student is also expected to learn and apply Geographic Information System (GIS) tools to create a historical map of British banks in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Project 3
The Impact of Deglobalization Uncertainty on Developing Countries’ Integration into Global Value Chains （林靜儀教授）
Motivation:
Goldberg & Reed (2023) argue that recent shifts in trade and geopolitical strategies are reversing decades of globalization. For developing countries, this introduces elevated uncertainty in export-driven growth models and global value chain (GVC) participation.
Research Questions:
- Does rising deglobalization uncertainty undermine the depth of developing countries’ GVC integration?
- Can strong institutional quality mitigate the adverse effects of such uncertainty?
- Does digital transformation play a buffering role against the economic impact of deglobalization?
Methodology
Panel data econometric models with interaction terms:
Uncertainty × Institutional Quality / Digitalization (using EPU indices, WGI, Digital Adoption Index).
Contribution
The project offers empirical insights into how developing nations can maintain external economic linkages under rising fragmentation and policy unpredictability, highlighting institutional and technological resilience as strategic assets.
Positions: 2 students.
Please refer to the outline below to create your own title and write aresearch proposal.
Project 4
Recalibrating the Cycle: Local Fiscal Responses to Political Incentives in Xi’s China （蔡璧涵教授）
Political budget cycles (PBCs) have been widely examined in electoral democracies, where fiscal expansions tend to align with electoral calendars (Vergne, 2009; Katsimi & Sarantides, 2012). There is also a growing body of research exploring cyclical fiscal behavior in authoritarian regimes (Bunce, 1980; Guo, 2009; Lu & Ma, 2015). While electoral motivations clearly explain PBCs in democracies, the underlying drivers in non-democracies are more complex. In the Chinese context, local officials have long faced uncertainty regarding their tenure, and since the 1980s, economic performance has been a central metric in the cadre evaluation and promotion system (Li & Zhou, 2005). As a result, local officials strategically operated under a performance-based promotion system that rewarded economic growth, incentivizing them to manipulate public spending to enhance their prospects for advancement. For example, Guo (2009) found that prefectural leaders increased aggregate spending during the second or third year of their term—approximately the average year of their tenure—suggesting promotion-driven budgeting. At the provincial level, officials have been shown to ramp up infrastructure spending and delay difficult reforms ahead of Party Congresses or leadership evaluations (Lu & Ma, 2015).
However, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China’s political and institutional landscape has shifted significantly. Centralized control has intensified through sweeping anti- corruption campaigns, top-down policy directives, and growing constraints on local fiscal autonomy. Xi has also explicitly stated that economic performance should no longer be the sole benchmark for assessing cadres. In this changing political and institutional environment, this project seeks to examine how PBCs at the provincial level have evolved under Xi's centralization. Specifically, it asks what the new pattern of PBCs looks like and what new incentives shape local fiscal behavior. Students participating in this project are expected to collect and clean panel data on provincial budgets and leadership cycles, and to conduct basic regression analysis using STATA.
Bunce, V. (1980). The political economy of reform in Eastern Europe. Comparative Politics, 12(3), 253–276.
Guo, G. (2009). China's local political budget cycles. American Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 621–632.
Katsimi, M., & Sarantides, V. (2012). Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy? Public Choice, 151(1–2), 325–362.
Li, H., & Zhou, L. A. (2005). Political turnover and economic performance: The incentive role of personnel control in China. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9–10), 1743–1762.
Lu, Y., & Ma, G. (2015). Political incentives, fiscal planning, and provincial expenditure cycles in China. China Economic Review, 36, 1–14.
Vergne, C. (2009). Democracy, elections and allocation of public expenditures in developing countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 25(1), 63–77.
Project 5
技術官僚對於經濟發展的貢獻：以戰後台韓發展為例 （趙相科教授）
二次大戰後發展中國家的經濟發展，技術官僚 (technocrats) 的政策制定對於國家發展佔有重要性的地位。但是對於技術官僚的養成，實際政策作為，與最終結果，有待歷史資料呈現。本研究可包含三部分：第一，技術官僚的定義，角色等文獻和理論分析，第二台灣與韓國在 1950—1980 技術官僚的名單、學經歷、功績等史料搜集，第三、兩國的技術官僚對於其經濟發展之貢獻的比較分析。申請同學應在申請書呈現初步背景分析，並證明自己的理論研究與歷史資料搜集和分析的能力。
趙相科教授 email: hkchao@mx.nthu.edu.tw
國立清華大學全球化經濟研究中心大專生研究計畫施行辦法.pdf